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Abstract  
Iraq is a very diverse country, both ethnically and religiously, and its political system is 
characterized by severe polarization along ethno-sectarian loyalties.  Since 2003, the country 
suffered from persistent indiscriminating terrorism and communal violence. Previous 
literature has rarely connected violence to election in Iraq. I argue that violence is responsible 
for the increases of within group cohesion and distrust towards people from other groups, 
resulting in politicization of the ethno-sectarian identities i.e. making ethno-sectarian parties 
more preferable than secular ones. This study is based on a unique dataset that includes civil 
terror casualties one year before election, the results of the four general elections of January 
30th, and December 15
th
, 2005, March 7
th
, 2010 and April 30
th
, 2014 as well as demographic 
and socioeconomic indicators on the provincial level. Employing panel data analysis, the 
results show that Iraqi people are sensitive to violence and it has a very negative effect on 
vote share of secular parties. Also, terrorism has different degrees of effect on different 
groups. The Sunni Arabs are the most sensitive group. They change their electoral preference 
in response to the level of violence.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the period between 2005 and 2014, Iraq had four general elections. The results of those 
elections show clearly that Iraqis voted according to their ethno-religious affiliation. Due to 
the fact that the violence in Iraq is remarkably high, then it should affect the economic, social 
and political life of all citizenry, including political preferences. I believe there are strong 
evidences that violence played a major role in politicization of ethno-religious cleavages in 
Iraq. This is worth exploring, because voting for ethnoreligious on the expense of secular 
nationalists parties lead to a paralyzed parliament that cannot agree on any effective 
legislation and which is unable to monitor the performance of the government (Barnes 2011, 
Cordesman and Khazia 2014). According to the Iraqi constitution the country is a 
parliamentary democracy with a proportional electoral system. With this institutional 
arrangement it is hardly able to produce a single political entity/party that is able to receive 
more than half of the votes. Hence, the governments are inevitably formed through coalitions 
of rival political parties that are deeply focused on representing ethnoreligious cleavages. The 
process of the formation of the Iraqi cabinets requires months or even more than a year to be 
accomplished due to the tough bargaining that aims to maximize the share of each 
ethnic/religious group of power and resources. This would affect the provision of civil order 
and basic public services like health, education, clean water and electricity which have 
already deteriorated.   
During the period between the establishment in 1920 and the 2003 US-led invasion, Iraq used 
to have very strong secular traditions (Wimmer, 2007). During the monarchy period (1920-
1958) there was no single religious party. In that time, political parties were mainly liberal, 
social nationalists and pan-Arabist. And in the period of series of military coups and single 
party rules (1958-2003) the main political parties were the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and 
Baath party (Dawisha 2009, Eppel 2004). However, in the late 1960s, Iraq witnessed a rise of 
Islamists parties like A-Dawaa Islamic Party and The Islamic Party (Al-Juburi, 2012). But, 
after the first democratic elections in January 30, 2005 Iraq faced the rise of ethnoreligious 
political powers. The period of post-2003 is characterized by severe communal violence and 
witnessed severe politicization of sub-national identities. Therefore, party cleavages have 
transferred from pan-Arabism verses liberal and social nationalist to ethnoreligious. As I 
stated earlier, the reason behind this phenomenon is violence.   
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There are many prominent scholars that have studied the effect of terrorism on voting 
preference in several countries like Bosnia, Israel, Spain and Turkey. All the studies on those 
countries proved that terrorism has significant effect on voter’s political choices. The findings 
show that terrorism mobilizes voters and shape their political preferences. It increases the 
level of turnout in the most of the cases and vote share of the right-wing parties. (Berrebi and 
Klor 2006 and 2008, Kibris 2010 and Bosnia 2010). However, despite the everyday terrorist 
attacks and sectarian conflict, there is no single study that takes into account the effect of 
violence on electoral outcome in Iraq. The literature that covers the ramifications of terrorism 
on voting behavior in Iraq is few and far between and characterized by overwhelmingly 
descriptive and normative discussions that lack strong empirical evidences. The inadequacy of 
the literature is not due to the irrelevancy of the topic, but rather the lack of data accessibility. 
Moreover, elections and voting itself are a new political practice in Iraq. 
In this paper, I argue that as the level of ethnoreligious violence increases in Iraq, the share of 
votes of secular-national parties’ decreases. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
identities are socially constructed and individuals have many identities for instance, national, 
ethnic, religious, tribal, regional etc. In the divided societies the level of politicizing of ethnic 
or sectarian identities depends on the socio-political context of each country. Violence is one 
of the most significant factors that politicize the sub-national identities (Fearon and Laitin 
2000, Schmidt and Spies, 2013 Wood 2008 and Gilligan 2014). The occurrences of the ethno-
sectarian violence will increase inter-group solidarity and distrust towards people from other 
groups. The ethnoreligious parties have more capacity to attract the voters who claim very 
strong ethnoreligious identities. The secular parties that have no claim of representing any 
particular group will face very hard time to convince the voters of the party’s catch-all 
policies. Unfortunately, Iraq fulfils all the requirements that encourage the ethnoreligious 
voting behavior. The country is too heterogeneous, consisting of three separate ethno-
religious groups- the Shiite, Sunni and the Kurds. Moreover, since the invasion in 2003, Iraq 
has gone through pervasive communal violence. 
I would like to mention, that I do not claim that violence can explain everything about 
ethnoreligious voting in Iraq. In fact there are many potential decisive factors that increase the 
politicization of ethnicities and religions, for instance the political history, geography, 
economy, the constitutional design and electoral system of the country. Many scholars argued 
that fragmented societies are more susceptible to ethnic politics (Lijphart 1977, Dahl 1971, 
Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), while others blame the constitutional design and electoral 
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systems in prompting ethnic voting (Reilly 2001, Fish and Kroenig, 2006, Campos and 
Kuzeyev, 2007).  
I believe this paper might be the first attempt to empirically and systematically study the 
consequences of violence on electoral outcome in Iraq. This study is based on the actual 
electoral choices of people in the country instead of voter’s perceptions in surveys. To 
measure the effect of violence on party choice in Iraq, I used a unique dataset that includes 
civil terror causalities one year before the election, the results of the four parliamentary 
elections in Iraq of January 30, 2005 December 15, 2005 2010 and demographic and 
socioeconomic indicators on the provincial level. By employing the time series cross sectional 
analysis technique, the results proved that there is a strong negative correlation between 
violence and the share of secular party of votes. These results coincide with the results of 
similar studies that were conducted in Israel, Spain, Turkey and Bosnia (Berrebi and Klor 
2006 and 2008, Kibris 2010 and Bosnia 2010). This paper also attempts to contribute to the 
few existing literatures on violence and election in Iraq and to expand our knowledge about 
this phenomenon in the countries that have similar social and political context. 
In the following chapters I am going to review the already existing literatures that cover the 
topic of terrorism and electoral outcome.  Following the literature review, I will focus on 
theoretical approach where I will explain the causal mechanism of how violence shapes 
people identities and political preferences. In the fourth chapter I will discuss the research 
design, methods and the quality of selected data. Next I will present the empirical analysis and 
its results. In the last chapter I will present the conclusion and discussion on the sociopolitical 
implication, contribution of this research to political science and the possibilities of future 
researches.  
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2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON TERRORISM AND VOTING 
In this section I will overview the state of art on terrorism and election literature in general, 
and then focus on Iraq. The section ends with a paragraph on the main shortcoming in the 
literature that needs to be covered by this research.  
2.1 Previous Literature on Terrorism and Elections  
Terrorism and election is a field of study that is relatively new, and hence the amount of 
literature is small (Kibris 2010, Gurr 1988, and Rapoport, & Weinberg, 2000). We know 
relatively much about the cause’s forms and the strategies of terrorists (Crenshaw, 1983) but 
we need to extend our knowledge on the consequences of terrorism (Berrebi and Klor 2008, 
Kibris 2010). There is a general agreement on the negative impact terrorism has on targeted 
states’ economies, social integration and political stability. People are sensitive to violence, 
but there is a little agreement on voter’s reaction towards terrorism.   
The research has generated two main common findings. First, terrorism encourages voting for 
right-wing political parties and second, it leads to government replacement. Some studies use 
a comparative quantitative approach. For example, Williams and others studied the effect of 
terrorism on the probability of government stability in 18 parliamentary democracies from 
1960s to 2003. They concluded that terrorism increases the likelihood of changing 
incumbents. However, the right-oriented governments have more capacity to absorb terrorist 
shocks (Williams et al, 2012). Gassebner and others examined the impact of terrorism on 
electoral accountability by using a model that includes 800 elections from 115 countries 
between 1968 and 2002. They find a positive relationship between terrorism and government 
replacement, and the effect increases according to the severity of the attacks (Gassebner et al 
2008). Other studies are single case oriented, using both quantitative and qualitative methods 
of analysis (Torcal and Rico 2004, Van Biezeni 2005, Berrebi and Klor 2006 and 2008, Kibris 
2010).  
There are some interesting papers on Bosnia, Israel, Spain and Turkey which are also 
ethnically divided nations like Iraq. Those papers find that terrorism has a very strong 
influence on voting behavior. Terrorism mobilizes people and affects their political choices.  
Terrorism increases the level of turnout and has a positive effect on the share of right-wing 
parties.  This conclusion has been reached in all of the mentioned countries above. For 
example, Kibris (2010) has empirically analyzed the effects of Turkish soldiers murdered by 
the Kurdish faction the PKK on voting behavior in Turkey between 1991 and 1995. She finds 
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that Turkish people are very sensitive to terrorism. When the level of terror fatalities increase 
the voting for right-wing parties increases as well, because right-wing governments are less 
inclined to concessions and are more likely to use military instead of political solutions to the 
Kurdish question in Turkey.  
Berrebi and Klor examined the relation between terrorism and voters’ preferences in Israel. 
The authors used the terrorist attacks in Israel between 1990 and 2003 and data from public 
opinion polls on Israelis’ political preferences. The authors find that the support for right-
wing political parties increases after the incidents of terrorist attacks increases, and Israel 
become more vulnerable to terrorism when left-oriented political parties are in power (Berrebi 
and Klor, 2006).   
Berrebi and Klor later on in 2008 elaborated their model on the relation between terrorism and 
party choice by using actual voting choice rather than the people preferences that expressed in 
the newspapers poll. They examined the timing and geographical effects of terrorism, which 
means the effect of the number of civil fatalities in a given locality one year before elections 
on voting choice. The results show that the support for right-wing parties increases in targeted 
locality and increases in support for left-wing parties outside the targeted localities. Also 
terrorism increases the left-right polarization of Israeli society (Berrebi and Klor, 2008).  
An unpublished manuscript deals with the Bosnian case, where the authors estimate the war 
time violence and ethnic voting. They used the data on causalities from the ethnic conflict in 
ex-Yugoslavia and the election results in Bosnia before and after the conflict. The results of 
this paper proved that people who were exposed to ethnic war horrors are more prone to vote 
on ethnic basis. The authors argue that ethnic conflict increases intra-ethnic cohesion and 
distrust towards people from other ethnicities (American Journal of Political Science. 
Manuscript Number: AJPS-38906).  
There is a respectful amount of literature on the effect of terrorism on Spanish electoral 
outcome since the March 11, 2004 Madrid’s terrorist attack (Powell 2004, Van Biezen 2005, 
Gassebener et al 2008, Montalvo 2011). The Madrid attacks make the Spanish case very 
interesting, because it happened several days after the attacks. The findings were a bit 
contradictory on the effect of terrorism on the election outcome, but all the literature suggests 
that the attacks have not only affected the voting preferences, but have also increased the level 
of the turnout. Al-Qaeda took responsibility for the attacks as a response to the Spanish troop 
participation in the invasion of Iraq. As a result of that, in the election the Spanish voters 
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blamed the incumbent center-right political parties for deploying the army in Iraq. According 
to Montalavo, the terrorist attacks have significantly affected the Spanish election. The 
election results of the voters who voted in advanced prior to attacks showed that the popular 
party received more votes than the left opposition. This means if the terrorist attacks would 
not have occurred, the Aznar would have won the election (Montalavo, 2012). Once again, 
what happened in Spain illustrates that terrorists act strategically. They knew that the attacks 
will push the Spaniards to vote for the left opposition which promised to withdraw the 
Spanish troop from Iraq if they win the election.  Therefore, most of the scholars have linked 
the center-right incumbent government foreign policy with terrorism.   As it is quite well-
known, terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Spanish political arena. ETA, the separatist 
faction in the Basque region has conducted many terrorist attacks in Spain. But this is the first 
time that the country is exposed to terrorism due to the foreign policy.  
Van Biezen believes that if the ETA was behind the Madrid’s March 11 attacks then the 
center-right parties would not be defeated in the election. Rather, they would have received 
more votes, because right-wing governments in Spain are more decisive to counter the ETA 
organization. But when Al-Qaeda announced its responsibility (external threat), that made the 
Spaniards blame the government’s foreign policy of war on terror and the invasion of Iraq 
(Van Biezen, 2005). The author’s interpretation of the effect of ETA’s terrorism on election 
outcome is in compliance with both Kibris, 2010 and Berrebia and Klor 2008 findings which 
suggest that terrorism encourages voting for the right wing parties. According to Powell, the 
popular party knew very well that by pinning the Basque separatists on Madrid’s attacks 
definitely would increase the chances of Aznar’s government to be reelected. Therefore, 
Aznar personally phoned the major Spanish newspaper editors to make sure that the blame 
will be on ETA.  One night before the election, the Spanish police found strong evidences that 
Al-Qaeda was behind the attacks (Powell, 2004). Therefore, millions of Spanish people 
demonstrated for being been cheated by the government and as a consequence, the left 
opposition won the election.  
Bali used survey data based on individual level to measure the effects of the Madrid’s terrorist 
attacks on the 2004 election outcome. The author concluded that the attacks led to a 
mobilization of citizens who are usually less likely to vote, like young and less educated 
citizens. It also mobilized the supporters of the center and left political parties. Bali suggests 
that both the foreign policy of the Aznar’s government and the timing of the attacks had 
maximized the effect of terrorism on voting choice (Bali 2007).  Torcal and Rico confirmed 
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the findings of Bali (2007) and Van Biezen (2005). The authors suggest that the reason behind 
the center-right parties’ defeat in the election is due to the increases in the turnout. The attack 
has mobiles the voters that are usually not engaged in politics to vote against the government 
regardless of the ideological orientation of the government (Torcal & Rico, 2004).  
These findings are confirming the hypothesis of Gassebner et al (2008) and Berrebi and Klor, 
(2008) on the terrorism and government replacement. However it contraindicates the 
hypothesis of Williams and coauthors (2012) about the capacity of the right-wing parties to 
absorb the ramifications of the terrorist shocks.  Montalavo believes the Madrid attacks have a 
significant impact on government replacement. The analysis suggests that the incumbent 
government would have received much more votes if the attack never happened (Montalvo, 
2012). 
Both comparative and single case studies with different methodical approaches suggest that 
terrorism has a serious impact on the electoral outcome; therefore I believe we need both 
approaches. By comparing we can see the resemblances and difference between various 
geographical zones and whereas focusing on a specific country will enrich our knowledge 
about the correlation of other social, demographical and political arrangements with violence 
on voting outcome.   
2.2 Literature on Terrorism and Elections in Iraq  
Unlike the countries mentioned above, the effect of terrorism on electoral outcome in Iraq is 
very scarce. There is no unified body of literature that studies terrorism and election in Iraq as 
inter-correlated phenomenon. Instead of that, the papers are either studying the election or the 
terrorism. The body of literature on election in Iraq is mostly descriptive and often used 
qualitative methods (Daneil and Pollack 2003, Fuller 2003, Ono 2005, Schwartz 2005, 
Dawisha and Diamond 2006, Wimmer 2007, Barnes 2011, Berman et al 2011,  Al-Tmimi 
2013). Although the literature is filled with theoretical expectations on violence and ethnic 
politics, it lacks strong empirical analysis. The scholars are clearly emphasis the rule of 
ethnosectarian political parties and the profound ethnosectarian voting trend in Iraq. However, 
there are no clear causal mechanisms that explain the effect of violence on voting behavior. 
Most of the scholarships argue that the democracy itself is one of the most reasons that cause 
the ethnosectarian violence in Iraq (Daneil and Pollack 2003).  
According to Wimmer (2007) Iraq is prone to ethnic politics. This is due to the fact that the 
country encompasses many ethnic and religious groups that have been persecuted for many 
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decades. The weakness of trans-ethnic civil organizations would turn the democracy itself to a 
mean of intensifying the ethnosectarian conflicts. But other scholars believe that after the 
implosion of the central government, democracy would be the best peaceful mechanism to 
overcome ethnosectarian conflict in Iraq (Byman and Pollack 2003). The major political 
powers in Iraq are mainly ethnoreligious by their nature such as Shiite, Sunni and Kurds 
(Schwartz 2003). In order to avoid the politicization of ethnicity we need to tune the 
constitutional design and electoral system of the country (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006 and 
Wimmer (2007). The Americans believed that the parliamentary with proportional 
representation electoral system will guarantee equal chances for all ethnic and religious 
groups to be represented. Soon after the invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority CPA 
formed the Iraqi Governing Council IGC in July 2003, that is consists of 25 members who 
reflect the ethnoreligious structure of the country. It includes 13 Shiite, 5 Sunni, 5 Kurds and 
2 for minorities. In the opinion of many students of Iraq’s politics that the IGC was the corner 
stone of the institutionalization of ethnic and religious cleavages in Iraq post-2003 (Dawisha, 
2009).  
However there are some interesting papers that are quantitatively studied the origin, 
motivation and tactics of terrorism in Iraq (Hafiz 2006 and 2007, Inglehart et al, 2006 Berman 
et al, 2011, Romano, 2914). For instance Hafez studied why some fractions used suicide 
terrorism more than others. He used quantitative data on terrorist attacks in different regions 
of Iraq and he concluded that suicide terrorism is used by the fractions which have no hope to 
participate in the political process and which aim to cause a regime collapse (Hafez, 2006).  
Berman and coauthors studied the effect of the provision of public services and jobs on the 
level of the joining insurgency in different ethnosectarian regions background. They used 
panel data that includes level of violence, socioeconomic indicators and budget spending on 
the provincial level in Iraq. The findings support that the provision of sufficient public 
services can minimize the severity and the support for insurgency Iraq (Berman et al, 2011). 
Inglehart and coauthors studied the effect of violence and level of trust among the difference 
ethnosectarian groups of Iraq.  They conducted a survey where they interviewed 2700 citizens 
representing all lingual, ethnic-sectarian groups from most of the regions of the country. The 
findings not surprisingly showed that due to the ethnosectarian violence, there is 
overwhelming feeling of in-group solidarity and high level of distrust of those who are not co-
ethnic (Inglehart et al, 2006).  I argue that the results of Inglehart’s study have very 
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importance political implications. Because the widespread feelings of distrust among the rival 
ethnoreligious groups in Iraq can be seen in election results.  
Finally, there is no single study that control for the effect of violence on electoral outcome in 
Iraq. This serious inadequacy is not because of the insignificance of the topic rather is due to 
deficiency of data. In order to examine the effect of violence on voting behavior in Iraq, we 
need reliable dataset which is not available yet in Iraq. We need credible sources to measure 
the level of violence, political parties, election results, and many socioeconomic variables. 
Therefore, I argue that my study might be the first attempt to systematically and empirically 
measure the ramifications of violence on voting behavior in Iraq.     
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3. THEORETICAL APPROACH   
3.1 Violence and Politicization of Ethno-Religious Identities  
This chapter aims to establish a theoretical basis for the empirical analysis. This can be done 
through clarifying the casual mechanism between violence and voting outcome in divided 
societies. Using a social constructivist approach, this study argues that violence increases the 
salience of sub-national identities like ethnicity and religion, by making individuals retreating 
to their primordial identities. Violence significantly contributes to politicizing ethno-sectarian 
identities and hence, violence shifts the voting to ethno-religious parties and reproduces the 
social cleavages through political system.  
Constructivists argue that our norms and values are socially constructed; our understanding to 
reality is based on those constructed concepts. An Individual’s behavior represents the 
reflections of communal beliefs. Individual interpretation of reality cannot be considered as 
more accurate than other interpretation, since it is not possible to compare them against any 
objective knowledge of a neutral reality (Haack, 1993). Therefore I believe that a 
constructivist approach is very appropriate to understand the level of politicization of ethno-
religious identities in divided societies (Bacchi and Eveline 2010, Bryman 2008 and Marsh 
and Stoker, 2010: p87). 
Constructivists believe that ethnic identities are socially constructed (Abrams and Hogg 1990, 
Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Individual’s identities are not constant over time; they are flexible 
and change according to changing political and economic circumstances (Chandra, 2012). 
People can possess many identities that reflect various social backgrounds like language, 
religion, sect, tribe or region (Chandra 2012, Posner 2004 and Wilkinson 2004). In the 
absence of strong universal identity (national) socioeconomic interest become less important 
and voting preferences and parties competition are directed towards group representation 
(Tavits and Letki, 2014).  Sub-national identities act as a filter that analyses information 
before making political decisions. Therefore ethnicities can play a decisive rule in the stability 
of the political system (Birnir, 2006). Also, the ethno-religious heterogeneous countries suffer 
from the competition between different ethnic or sect groups to claim nationhood, each 
struggle to be the predominant one and the one which is identical to the state “Staatsvolk” 
(Wimmer, 2003). Hence, the competition is not over power and resources only but also over 
the state identity. The societies that suffer from severe identity tensions, the rule of state-
identity become more salience than economic and any other considerations. The strong ethno-
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religious identification makes it both desirable for political factions and ethnic groups to 
assemble along ethnic lines (Schmidt and Spies, 2013) and then it will be very difficult to 
escape the centrifugal predispositions that separate the society. Also, the degree of politicizing 
of ethnic groups in divided societies depends primarily on the level of representation and 
inclusion in decision making and the different groups’ share of the resources and public 
services (Birnir, 2006). Thus, the merely ethno-religious cleavages are not the sole reason for 
polarization unless it is associated with discrimination and imbalance in power sharing 
(Fearon, and Laitin 2000, Wimmer 2003). 
I argue that inter-communal violence negatively affect the solidarity of the multi-group 
societies. The violence generates sensitive and strong sub-national identities that are based on 
ethnicity/religion/language which depends on the motivation for the violence. Therefore, the 
support for group representation inclusive parties survives long time after the conflicts.  
When the state fails to enforce the law, the intra-violence pushes most people to hunkering 
down behind their religion or ethnicity group looking for protection. For those who refuse to 
take a side in the conflict will become more vulnerable to the risk of being targeted by rival 
groups because targeting neutrals will be less expensive and with no serious consequences. 
Then individuals will retreat to their primordial identities, which become stronger over time, 
because a weak government cannot protect people from arbitrary violence neither guarantee 
the equality in front of the law (Wimmer, 2003). The existential survival of the individuals 
and the group to which they belong will take the highest priority (Ingelhart et al, 2006). The 
bad externalities of intra-communal violence may last quite long even after the violence level 
went down (Gilligan, 2014) 
Recognizing ethnic or religious identity and as a protection shield against the potential risks 
from others, enhances the pride in sub-identity on the expense of national identity. It also 
leads to the creation of positive images on people who share same sub-identity and create a 
negative stereotype of people of other denominations (Fearon, and Laitin 2000). In practice, 
this means that in-group cohesion and distrust of people from out-group increases.  Threats to 
existential security like massive waves of terrorism and mutual ethnic violence make all 
individuals’ preferences disappear in favor of group survival.  
“Survival values are functional under these conditions, but they force people to focus on the well-
being of one’s in-group, viewing outsiders with suspicion and distrust. At the same time, these 
conditions induce people to close ranks against dangerous outsiders, producing rejection of outsiders 
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and in-group solidarity. This syndrome of rejection of outsiders, combined with rigid conformity to in-
group norms and established traditions, bears some resemblance to the cluster of traits described in 
the Authoritarian Personality literature, but while the Authoritarianism thesis attributed these traits to 
rigid child-rearing practices, our interpretation attributes them to existential insecurity” (Ingelhart et 
al, 2006). 
Thus these sub-national identities become more important and the whole political game 
rotates along ethnic/religious loyalties. Ethno-religious parties will take advantage of playing 
the ethno-religious card. In the election campaigns such parties focus primarily on claims 
such the representation and struggle for ethnic/religious groups’ rights. In such circumstances, 
secular-national parties face a very hard time to convince the public of the importance of 
national unity and citizenship as the engine of political game. Consequently, voting 
preference no longer depends on economy or issue politics rather it based on group 
survival/preference (Tavits and Letki, 2014). If the level of violence is too high then people 
will prioritize security and group existential survival when they vote (Ingelhart et al, 2006).   
The intensifying of ethno-religious identities does not require that all people are exposed to 
violence directly. The intra-conflicts are always associated with massive internal 
displacement. People who do not take part in the communal conflict fled to the safe co-group 
regions. The displaced people will definitely tell stories about the brutal violence they 
suffered from in their original places. Also, media and different sources of outlet coverage on 
casualties and incidents make people from different parts and groups of the country aware of 
their cohort’s losses.  
In these circumstances with increasing in-group cohesion and distrust of out-group, I argue 
that the ethnic/religious community adopts a substantial role in the individual’s survival and 
identity. Individual awareness of personal safety and welfare will be more connected with the 
security and wealth of their community. The individuals of each group will perceive their 
personal interest is coinciding with group interest. It's hard to be allowed to listen to any other 
points of view that do not put the narrow interests of the ethnic/ religious group above all 
other considerations (Schmidt and Spies, 2013). In other words if you do not vote for the co-
ethnic/religious candidates then you will risk your group survival and interests.  
Unsurprisingly, political parties that advocate a specific ethnic/religious identity are more 
prone to mobilize voters from groups which they claim to represent, because they will benefit 
from in-group solidarity and out-group distrust communal feelings within each group. Once 
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they are in office they will adopt policies that favor their own group interest. Then, the 
electoral process will rely on the ethno-religious clientele’s circles. They will exploit the 
masses’ fear of terrorism and indiscriminate violence, as well as fear of exclusion and 
marginalization of the rival group dominant, in order to maximize their electoral gains. 
Therefore, ethno-religious political parties will adopt an extreme exclusionary discourse 
during electoral campaigns, highlighting the number of terrorist incidence and terror fatalities 
and blaming other ethnic or religious groups for terrorism. I argue that this is exactly the 
dynamics or the logic of violence and ethno-religious voting behavior.    
All in all, I argue that the identities are socially constructed. People have many identities like 
ethnicity or religion. In divided societies the level of politicizing ethnic or sectarian identities 
depends on the socio-political context of each country. Violence is one of the most significant 
factors that politicize ethnic/religious/sectarian/lingual/triable identities. The occurrences of 
the ethno-sectarian violence will increase in-group solidarity and out-group distrust. The 
ethno-sectarian political parties have more chances to benefit from sympathy and votes of the 
ethnic or sect that they claim representing her. Secular-national political parties that adopt 
universal political programs have lower chances to convince the voters from rival groups. As 
a result, the ethnic-sectarian voting behavior will continue long time even after concession 
and settlement. The ethno-sectarian parties will reproduce itself over and over in each election 
until the memories of mutual violence ceases and practical and vital universal policies are 
implemented.  
However, this study does not claim that violence explains everything about voting behavior in 
divided societies. In fact, there are many factors that potentially contributed to this kind of 
voting outcome.  Those factors could be historical, geographical and institutional. The 
literature suggests that the constitutional design and electoral design are very decisive in 
divided societies. Many scholars argue that fractionalized societies are prone to instability and 
ethnic politics (Lijphart 1977, Dahl 1971, Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). While some others 
argue that diversity is good for open politics, divers societies are not necessarily a prisoner of 
ethnic politics (Reilly 2000). The institutional arrangements are responsible for mediating the 
competition among rival ethnic/religious groups. Good and well-designed institutions are 
more capable to peacefully contain power struggle the divided nations (Reilly 2001, Fish and 
Kroenig, 2006, Campos and Kuzeyev, 2007). For example parliamentary with proportional 
representation system encourages ethnic parties and representation (Gerring et al 2004, 
Gerring et al 2005, Persson et al 2003 and Oates 1999). Last not least the timing can reveal 
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different outcome. Elections that take place in newly established democracies instantly after a 
severe ethno-religious conflict are more likely to produce higher level of ethno-religious 
voting. The Bosnians case is good example about the importance of timing. The ethnic voting 
trend decreases over time, the vote’s share of ethnic parties are constantly decreased in 2006, 
2010 and 2014 elections.  
As with any social phenomenon or problem there are countless of variables that can affect the 
outcome. Controlling for all the potential variables is a very nice idea, but it requires a lot of 
reliable empirical data and an advanced and appropriate methodological tool to handle. Even 
in the papers that measured the effect of terrorism of election outcome in other countries like 
Israel, Spain and Turkey the authors have not given any considerable explanation of the other 
potential variables that have been discussed above. However, most of the papers in the 
previous research have controlled for socioeconomic indicators in examining the relationship 
between violence and voting behavior, which is very reasonable idea indeed. Therefore, in 
this paper I want to make it clear that I am aware of other potential mediator variables, but the 
focus will be on the effect of violence in divided societies on ethnic-religious voting behavior, 
considering the time and spatial variation of violence and socioeconomics indicators. Other 
potential explanations are left for qualitative analysis.  
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3.2 Hypothesis 
To sum the two previous chapters, in the last two decades there has been an increasing interest 
in the research of terrorism and voting behavior. Based on overview of the existing literature 
and theoretical approach, the testing the effect of violence on electoral outcome in a country 
like Iraq is rarely conducted. The main shortcoming in the literature on elections and violence 
in Iraq is the lack empirical analysis. Most of the research cover the violence and elections in 
democratic countries and argue that the violence mobilize the voters and effects their voting 
preference. According to the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter, the hypothesis 
expressed as follow: 
Violence has a negative effect on the vote share of secular parties and a positive effect on the 
vote share of ethno-sectarian parties. 
It would be a great idea to test how violence shapes the Iraqi people voters’ reaction toward 
the incumbent government, but since 2003 all Iraqi governments were based on coalitions that 
includes all political parties in the parliament. Also, most of the political coalitions among 
various political parties were very flexible. Therefore, it is very hard to know which political 
party is the government and which belongs to the opposition. Hence, it is very difficult to put 
the blame on any particular political party. However, based on the available evidence it is 
very plausible to believe that there is a strong causal mechanism between violence and ethno-
sectarian voting in Iraq, as violence reinforces the ethno-sectarian identities, increases in-
group cohesion and distrust of other groups.  
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS  
This chapter aims to discuss the case of Iraq, research design, and methods of data selection 
as well as the analysis that is used to test the hypothesis. This is an empirical study that uses 
panel data analysis, OLS regression. The data that is used in this research are secondary data 
that officially have been compiled and published by various International, National 
organizations and NGOs, governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. Before the 
discussion of the methodological consideration, I will discuss the case of Iraq.   
4.1 The Case of Iraq: Heterogeneity, Violence and Elections  
Unfortunately enough, Iraq fulfils all conditions for a pervasive politicization of ethnicity and 
ethno-sectarian voting behavior. First, the country is too heterogeneous that have many 
ethnicities and religions (Wimmer, 2007). The demographic composition of the country 
include Shiite Arab (55%) Sunni Arab (18.4 %) Kurd (21.1%) as well as Turkmen, Assyrian 
and others small indigenous groups (about 5%) (The Gulf Project 2000, see the ethnoreligious 
composition map of Iraq Appendix. 6). Second, the country suffers from persistent sectarian 
and arbitrary violence since the invasion in 2003. Third, the presence of ethno-sectarian 
political parties that dominant the Iraqi political scene and competing in a fairly regular 
elections.  
After the US-led coalition invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority CPA issued two 
majors laws which dissolved the Iraqi army and secret police and banned the Ba’ath Party 
from participation in the new political process. Both the army and the Ba’ath party were 
predominantly controlled by Sunnis (Dawisha, 2009 and Eppel, 2004). The consequence of 
those two decisions is a progressive Sunni insurgency. At the beginning, the Sunni insurgents 
targeted the Americans and Iraqi security forces, but overtime they start to wage attacks on 
softer targets that included the civilians from Shiite and Kurd communities who rejoiced the 
collapse of Saddam’s regime and supported the new established one. In response to that, 
Shiite militias attacked the Sunni neighborhoods in retaliation to the suicide terrorism 
(Dawisha and Diamond 2006). After that, the skirmishes transformed into severe sectarian 
warfare between Sunni and Shiite, especially during the period between 2006 and 2007. 
The Sunni insurgency groups include the national Islamist (e.g Islamic Army in Iraq) and 
former Baathist groups, military and security service personnel in addition to the local and 
international Salafists Jihadists (e.g Al-Qaeda). All those groups aim to force Americans to 
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leave Iraq. However, they have different plans for post-liberation time. The Baathists’ and 
alike’ intention is to restore the role of the former Baathist rule in Iraq, as well as to reduce 
the growing political influence of the Shiite and Kurds, while the international Jihadists aim to 
turn Iraq into a base for global jihadism (Hafiz 2006).  
The Jihadists use suicide terrorism and explosives attacks primarily on Shiite communities, 
aiming to spike a civil war between the Shiite and Sunni, where they can play the Sunni 
protector role in the face of the Shiite hegemony. Civil war leads to regime collapse and hence 
turns Iraq to a terrorist’s heartland. The Baathists are less likely to create a civil war because 
they are aware that the Sunni will take the burden of the casualties if they fight against the 
Shiite majority. Therefore, they concentrate their attacks on the Americans and Iraqi security 
forces (Hafiz 2006).  
On the other hand, the Shiite militia groups, which are entirely Islamist, include the Mahdi 
Army, Badr Organization and others. The most active Shiite militia is Mahdi Army which 
aims to force Americans to leave Iraq at the beginning and after the militia engaged in the 
Sunni-Shiite communal warfare. The militia was engaged for years in serious conflicts with 
the Iraqi government in the middle and the south of the country, due to the struggle over 
controlling the Shiite community.  
The map of violence in Iraq is somewhat complicated, but in general can be divided as 
follows: The Sunni factions fight the Americans, the Iraqi government and Shiite 
communities (to a lesser extent Kurds), while the Shiite militias fight the Americans, to lesser 
extent the Iraqi forces, Sunni factions and other competing Shiite militia. In this thesis I am 
interested in the effect of civilian deaths resulting from non-state actors on political choices of 
Iraqi people, whether the perpetrators are Sunni or Shiite, nationalist Islamists, Baathists, 
former military officers, or local and international Jihadists. 
It worth to mention, that the level of violence is varies across different regions. The highest 
grade of violence is mainly concentrated in the sectarian heterogeneous regions and in the 
regions where Sunni are the majority of the population. The three Kurdish provinces were the 
least violent region. In the south of Iraq, the Shiite majority region, there was much lower 
sectarian violence, however the main trend of violence was between the competing Shiite 
militias and Iraq government.  
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After the massive waves of violence in all over the Iraq, the U.S. government sent more 
troops to Iraq in order to restore the civil peace in an operation called “The Surge”. New 
Sunni tribal fighters financed and trained by the Americans called Sons of Iraq (SoI) 
participated in confronting the Sunni radical factions like Al Qaeda and the like. At the same 
time, the Iraqi government waged considerable campaigns to contain the influence of Shiite 
militias in Baghdad and south of Iraq.   
Since the summer of 2008, the security situation has gradually improved. The level of 
violence has significantly declined. However, the arbitrary sectarian violence never came to 
an end. The period between 2009 and 2012 witnessed considerable decreases in the level of 
violence. The annual average of casualties reached to about 5000, while in 2006 and 2007 was 
about 30000 in all over Iraq. This means the security situation improved by 90% comparing to 
2006-2007- the bloodiest two years. Moreover, the period between 2009 and 2012 were the 
most relative calm years in Iraq since the US-led invasion (IBC, See figure 2). And as the 
violence fluctuated over time, the vote share of secular parties did so as well.  
Figure 2: Level of civilian causalities in all over Iraq from 2003 to 2015  
 
 Source: Iraq Body Count https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ 
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4.2 Panel Data Analysis and Official Statistics  
As this research aims to explore the relationship between violence and voting behavior in 
Iraq, then Longitudinal or Panel data analysis is the most appropriate design to conduct this 
research. This design allows the researcher to capture the changes of the social phenomena 
over time, because it contains information collected from the same variable for the same unit 
of analysis at different points in time (Finkel 1995, Hsiao 2003, Bryman 2008).  Also, the 
longitudinal analysis has been used in most of the previous papers that traced the voting 
behavior and terrorism (Berrebi and Klor 2006 and 2008, Bali 2007, Kibris 2010 and the 
Bosnian case*).  This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between the level of 
violence and party choice in Iraq. In order to test the hypothesis of this research, I will use 
Multiple Linear Regression Models which is used to explore the relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variables (Greene, 2008). The models of this paper are 
projected by applying Ordinary Least Square OLS technique. According to Bartels (2009) it is 
important to decide whether to estimate the models by using random or fixed effect. One way 
to test whether this assumption holds is to estimate both a random- and a fixed effect model 
and then conduct a Hausman test. The Hausman test takes the squared difference of the 
estimated coefficients between the random and fixed effects models over the difference in the 
estimated variance for the coefficients. The test is based on a chi-square distribution where the 
null-hypothesis is that the random effects model is the correct model. 
There are several advantages of using panel data design. For example it enables the researcher 
to infer a casual mechanism between the variables that represent the case under study. Due to 
the fact that panel data has at least two observations in different points of time of the same 
variable, this means that there are possibilities to reveal social change and with improving the 
understanding of causal influences, better able to deal with the problem of ambiguity about 
the direction of causal mechanism (Bryman 2008).   
However and according to Bryman there are some theoretical and practical problems that 
associated with using panel data which summarized as follow:  sample attrition, timing or 
juncture to conduct more waves of data collection, little apparent planning and panel 
conditioning effect (Bryman, 2008 p 49-52). Fortunately enough, and since I am using data 
that already exists and which is based on actual electoral choice and not survey data (except 
socioeconomic indicators), most of the disadvantages do not apply this research model.   
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The data that is used in this research are official data. There are many advantages of using 
official statics in social science research. For example it saves both time and cost for the 
researcher, because it is already exists. These kinds of data are often characterized by high 
quality because it gathered and prepared by very qualified persons. The most important thing 
is that official statistics gives the opportunity for longitudinal analysis and reanalysis of the 
same social phenomenon from different approach in the future. Because most of the time 
research questions emerges from the existing literature and available information (Bryman, 
2008 p 296-300). However there are some limitations that emerge with using official 
statistics. The most important one is the absence of key variables, which means the researcher 
needs some important variables that are not exist in the data. For example there are very few 
socioeconomic variables from Iraq on local level. There were some very good indicators that 
well-fit this research model but unfortunately does not includes all regions or have conducted 
for one time only. The second limitation is the lack of control over the data quality and lack of 
familiarity of data (Bryman, 2008 p 300). Although the data are obtained from well-
established institutions, but the author has no control over data quality or management.    
4.3 Data Selection and Method of Collection  
In this section I will discuss and motivate the data selection, methods of collections and the 
implication of the selected data, as well as a discussion on the limitation of those data based 
on relevant literature and empirical practices. The data are classified into independent, 
dependent and control variables.   
The data on civil casualties obtained from a non-profit international organization the Iraq 
Body Count (IBC). The data on party choice are extracted from the Iraqi elections results 
which conducted by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and United Nation 
Mission Assistance to Iraq (UNAMI). The data on ethnic and religious composition of Iraq 
are from the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) and the Gulf/2000 Project at the 
School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University in New York City. The 
data on socioeconomic status are collected from the United Nation Development Program 
(UNDP) and Central Statistical Organization in Iraq (CSO). 
The biggest challenge of this research was the data and collection. The model of this analysis 
relies on a unique dataset that includes information from different sources. To get a piece of 
information it requires tens of correspondents and phone calls, sometimes taking weeks. 
Especially the Iraqi governmental agencies are very hesitant in offering official statics. Due to 
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the decades of authoritarian regimes, the Iraqi bureaucratic apparatus consider most of the 
information matters of national security.   For example the IHEC refused to offer any 
information on sub-provincial electoral results, and the Iraq Central Statistical Organization 
CSO refused to offer any information on other potential control variables like GDP per capita, 
inflation rate, unemployment and under-5 mortality rates.  
There are considerable amount of data available in the Iraqi governmental and quasi-
governmental agencies, NGOs, political parties and media archive, but it is too fractionalized 
and needs to reshape and recoded in order to make useable for quantitative analysis. I will 
quote here from Arain A. Aamir the Director, UN Integrated Electoral Assistance & UN 
Principal Electoral Advisor UNAMI correspondent when I asked him for the electoral data. 
He wrote “The data available is enormous and like anything else in Iraq these days badly 
managed too. I am also mindful of the fact that no sensitive information goes out 
contradicting privacy of individual concerned”. 
4.3.1 Independent Variable: Data on Civil Casualties  
To measure the level of violence I used the number of civil casualties per one thousand 
citizens one year before election resulting from terrorist activities on provincial level.  When 
measuring the effect of civil fatalities, considering the population size in each region is 
important, because the expectation that violence have much more effect in smaller regions. 
For example the death of ten civilian in a city that has couple of hundreds of thousands 
inhabitants has more effect comparing to Baghdad that has about 7 million inhabitants. The 
other alternative to measure the violence is the number of terrorist attacks, but I think using 
the civil casualties is more accurate. According to literature the severity of terrorist attacks is 
very meaningful. Assumedly, the attacks that yield more casualties have more effect on voting 
behavior (Gassebner et al 2008). Therefore, counting the terrorist incidents might be 
misleading in this case, because various attacks differ in severity. Some are very big and 
causes tens of deaths and others can be less harmful. Hence the number of casualties has more 
capacity to stimulate the feeling of threat to existential security according to the theoretical 
approach of this study.  
Actually, there are too many political and religious, national and international factions that 
cause the death of civilians in Iraq. According to IBC  “Since March 2003 a number of wars 
have been fought in Iraq: aggressive, humanitarian, pre-emptive, civil; they have taken the 
form of air raids, shootings, executions, mortar attacks, IED explosions and car bombs; they 
have been fought by several parties, some Iraqi, others non-Iraqi, some occupying, others 
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state-controlled, some insurgent, while others terrorist. There are perhaps as many as 40 
different groups, but the major groups of armed insurgency are, Ba'athists, Iraqi nationalists, 
Sunni Islamists, Salafi/Wahhabi “jihadists”, Shi'a militias, foreign Islamist volunteers. In 
addition, there are US-led coalition forces and Iraqi government forces”. 
The IBC provide very detailed information about the victims of violence, the location, the 
timing, the weapon and the perpetrators. I classified the propagators into two groups. First are 
the anti-government and occupation actors and the unknown as one group, because both of 
those two propagators are considered terrorist factions and use very harmful methods to 
achieve their goals, killing thousands of civilians every month. Therefore, regardless of the 
terrorist faction orientation whether it is radical Islamist or Baathist and whether aiming to 
regime collapse or to coerce the Iraqi government they treated the same in this model. Second 
are the US-led coalition and Iraqi forces. I will compare the effect of deaths among civilians 
caused by American and Iraq forces to those which caused by terrorist and insurgent groups 
on voting behavior. “Deaths from terrorist attacks are far more salient than those from other 
causes” (Inglehart et al, 2006 p 495). Following there are two tables that show the 
classification of the main propagators and weapons that cause civilian death in Iraq.  
Table 1: Preparators and weapons that are used in murdering the Iraqi civilians. 
Preparator US-led 
Coalition 
US-led 
Coalition & 
Iraqi Forces  
Iraqi Forces 
Without Coalition  
Forces 
Anti-
government/occupati
on Actors 
Unknown 
Actors 
 
 Source: Iraq Body Count https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ 
4.3.2 Dependent Variables: Data on Political Parties, Elections and Party Choice 
Elections results and Party Choice  
To measure ethno-sectarian voting behavior I will use the percentage of ethno-sectarian 
parties votes received in the general elections of January 30
th
, 2005; December 15
th
, 2005; 
March 7
th
, 2010; April 30
th
, 2014. The data on elections are obtained from the Independent 
High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and The United Nation Mission Assistant to Iraq 
(UNAMI). I classified the political parties either secular-nationalist or ethno-sectarian parties. 
The secular-nationalist parties are those who have no claim to represent or advocate any 
Weapon 
 
Explosives Air Attack Gunfire Suicide Attack 
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particular group, they are secular and cross-ethnic/religion organizations. The ethno-sectarian 
parties are those which claim the representation of a specific ethnic or sect group, namely the 
Shiite, Sunni and Kurd parties. I argue that using people’s actual voting preference to measure 
voting behavior is the best available option. It is much more accurate and more 
comprehensive comparing with survey data. However, the election results provided by the 
IHEC include the wining political parties only. It is preferred to have data on the whole 
electoral results that include the parties and candidates who below the electoral divider (the 
minimum number of votes to win one seat in the parliament).    
As matter of fact there are hundreds of thousands of wasted votes every election because of 
the electoral system. Most of the hidden votes are represents independent candidates, small 
parties or party lists which are mainly secular. However we cannot assume it is completely 
represents secular voting choices since the IHEC in Iraq has not yet published the whole 
voting results. I argue that those wasted or hidden votes are very important and have strong 
statistical significance if it possible to include it in the analysis.  For example the January and 
December 2005 elections the published results represent entirely the wining political parties. 
In 2010 elections the total number of wasted votes in all over Iraq was about one million out 
of 10,5 million votes. While in 2014 the number was more than two millions out of 12,5 
million votes.  
Political Parties 
Iraqi political parties can primarily be divided into two main groups- the ethnoreligious and 
the secular. The ethnoreligious can be further divided into ethnic and religious. The ethnic are 
mainly the Kurdish, Turkmen, and pan-Arabism parties. The religious parties are mainly 
Shiite and Sunni. The Christian parties are both ethnic and religious, because the Christian 
minority in Iraq has their own indigenous. The mainstream parties are Islamist (which can be 
either Shiite or Sunni), ethnic (like Kurdish and pan-Arabism) and other small parties that 
represent various linguistics and religious minorities (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006). Despite 
that the secular parties are the oldest in Iraq, they have relatively little influence on Iraq 
politics today.   
The Shiite’s political parties’ (e.g. Dawah Islamic Party, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council SIIC 
and Sadrist Movement) campaign primarily focus on that the Shiite are the majority. They 
have been persecuted for a very long time and now they have the right to rule Iraq.  Also, they 
emphasize continuation to fight hard terrorism and make sure that the Saddamists-Baathists 
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will not become part of the new political life of the country.  Sunni political parties’ (e.g. 
Islamic Party and Iraqi Front for National Dialogue) campaigns focus on the fact, that the 
Sunni are exposed to too many grievances in the new regime after 2003. The de-
Baathification and dissolving former army were meant to punish them. They believed that the 
Shiite political powers are overrepresented, have dominated the Iraqi policy making process 
and de-Arabized the country through their strong ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 
sum, the Sunni’s parties main demands, they want to restore Sunnis’ rights, to recognize anti-
American and anti-state paramilitary factions as legitimate national groups, which have a 
legitimate reasons to fight occupation (when Americans were in the country 2003-2011), to 
abolish anti-Baath policies and to emphasize the Arabic identity of Iraq. The other 
mainstream political parties are the ethnic Kurdish (e.g. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan OUK, 
Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP and Gorran). They focus mainly in their campaigns on more 
autonomy from the center and to change the conditions of oil and natural resources 
investment and distribution. The secular political parties like the Iraqi Communist Party, Iraqi 
National Accord, and the Civil Democratic Alliance focus more on promoting the Iraqi 
national identity, minimizing religious, sectarian and ethnic cleavages, state building based on 
meritocracy and to fight corruption. Due to the absence of the classical left-right scale in Iraqi 
political system, I used secular versus ethno-sectarian division, where secular represents the 
left/liberal values and ethnoreligious represents the conservative or right-wing (See the list of 
political parties in Iraq, Appendix 6).  
4.3.3 Control variables  
Demographic: Data on Ethnic and Religious Groups  
Since the conflict and voting behavior in Iraq is based on ethno-religious loyalties, I will use 
the demographic composition of each province to reveal the effect of ethno-sectarian 
background on voting choice. The literature suggests that in multiethnic societies the elections 
act, in general as, a census that determines the size of different ethnic groups in a given 
country. Iraq is very diver’s country that has many ethnic and religious groups. Ethnically, it 
composes of Arabs (75%), Kurds (17%), Turkmen (2%), Chaldeans, Assyrians, and 
Armenians (5%) of the population. Religiously, mainly are Shiite (60%) and Sunni (35) 
Muslims (both Arabs and Kurds), Christians (Chaldeans, Assyrians and Armenians), Kurdish 
Yazidis and a small number of Kaka’i , Shabaks , Sabean Mandaeans and Jews (almost of 
whom were forced to leave the country). The main locations for Shiite Arab are in the middle 
and south-east of the country. The Sunnis are concentrated in the western and northern Iraq. 
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Kurds live mainly in the far north of the autonomous Kurdistan region, in addition to Ninawa, 
Kirkuk, Salah ad Din and Diyalah governorates (see Table 2 the Appendixes 1, 4 and 5). The 
percentage of the Iraq’s ethnoreligious groups are based on estimations of the Gulf 2000 
Project, the Empirical Studies of Conflicts, the European Parliament report on minority rights 
in Iraq 2015 and the previous literature (Eppel 2004, Dawisha and Diamond 2006, Dawisha 
2009 and Wimmer 2007).  
                                                  Table 2: Ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. 
 
 
         Ethnicities 
Arabs 
Kurds 
Turkmen 
Chaldeans-Assyrians  
Armenians 
 
 
        Religions  
Shiite Muslims 
Sunni Muslims 
Christians  
Yazidis 
Kaka’i 
Sabean/Mandaean 
Jews 
                                                            Sources: European Report on Iraq’s minority rights 
Socioeconomic Indicators: Education, Health, Infrastructure and Economics  
The literature on economy and voting behavior suggest using the GDP per capita, 
unemployment and inflation rates as control variables (Kinder 1979, Nannestad and Paldam 
1997, Lewis-beck and paldam 200). Unfortunately, those variables are either unavailable on 
provincial level in Iraq or not published and very hard to get. Therefore, I will use several 
indicators from a series of deprivation of human condition reports conducted by the UNDP 
and ICSO of Iraq. Those variables represent the deprivation in different public services 
sectors. The deprivation is a measure that shows how bad is the quality of the provision of 
public services in each province in the different sectors: education, health, housing, household 
economic and infrastructure. The reason behind choosing this data is because it is the only 
one that covers all the provinces and has been conducted more than one time. In addition, 
those variables are characterized by high quality and accuracy. They are coming from a 
nation-wide surveys conducted by the UNDP and ICSO in 2004, 2007, 2011 and 2014.    
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4.4 The Limitation of the Selected Data  
The main concern about the data that is used in this research is the level of units of analysis. 
Iraq is administratively divided into 18 provinces, the provinces are subdivided into 120 
districts (Qaza) and the districts also subdivided into sub-district (Nahiya) and there are 320 
of these. Most of the data on Iraq is available on provincial level only. Hence, the limitation 
of this model data is about the degree of disaggregation rather than the quality or the 
reliability, because the data are the product of very experienced and highly professional 
institutions. It is credible and with high quality. The problem is about the deficiency of data 
on lower levels than provincial. The aggregation of the data on provincial level makes it 
possible to conduct a quantitative analysis, since the number of units of analysis is (18) 
multiplied by (4) Iraqi general elections (Harrell, 2001).  
It is better to have larger number of observations (n) when running quantitative research 
analysis, because more observations produce better statistical significance. In this research, if 
we use data on district or sub-district level would provide much more accurate results. Almost 
in all the papers that have empirically analyzed the topic of violence and voting behavior used 
data on district (municipality) level (Berrebi and Klor, 2006 and 2008, Kibris 2010). For 
example the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel provides information on voters, turnout and 
election results even at the level of polling station. Likewise the Turkish Institute of Statics 
has information on elections at least on district level. 
When it comes to violence we have records on provincial level only. Actually, this ignores the 
fact that in many provinces with relatively good security situation, some districts and sub-
districts are completely free from terrorist attacks and terror casualties. However, even 
districts that have not suffered any terrorist attacks/violence, but are part of the province that 
has suffered an instance of terrorism, would be counted as being have exposed to terrorism. 
For example, since 2003 Muthanna province south of Iraq with almost entirely Shiite 
population witnessed three explosive care incidents two of them occurred in As-Samawah city 
district and one in Al-Rumaytha district. The rest of the districts and sub-districts have never 
been attacked, however we calculate the whole Muthanna province as one unit of analysis 
which means ignoring within the province variation in the level of violence. The same 
principle goes for each parameter. Also, it is worth to mention that there is a very close 
national and international media coverage, national and international censuses on terrorism in 
Iraq like Iraqi Body Count IBC. The Iraqi official agencies (like Ministry of Health MoH, 
Ministry of Interior MoI and the National Security Agency) have very detailed information on 
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terror incidents and fatalities on municipality level. However, this information is not made 
publically available and a person needs a special permit to have an access to such information.   
And as the socioeconomic indicators can vary across regions, Iraq is like most of the 
developing countries, characterized by the concentration of most of the resources and public 
services in the center, while the peripheries suffer from neglecting and poor quality of public 
services. The center is often meant to be the capital city and the major metropolitan and the 
periphery is the small localities and rural areas. This means there are differences between and 
within the provinces. According to the UNDP and ICSO survey reports there is actually great 
deal of difference in the quality of public services between different part of the country and 
between the urban and ruler areas within the same region.  
4.5 Operationalization and Specifications of the Models 
The dataset of this research has the minimum number of observations for implementing Panel 
Data Models. The unit of analysis is the province (n=18) in four general elections (n=72). To 
estimate the models of this study, I will use the statistical software package “Stata”. The focal 
relationship of this analysis is between violence and party choice. The independent variable is 
the civil casualties per thousand inhabitants one year before election; the dependent variable is 
the vote share of secular parties in the Iraqi parliamentary elections results of January 2005, 
December 2005, 2010 and 2014. Control variables are the ethnoreligious composition and 
socioeconomic indicators. The ethnoreligious was coded 1, 2 and 3 that indicates that the 
observation occurs into “Arab”, “Kurd” or “Mixed” province. The socioeconomic indicators 
include: population size, education, health, household economic status and infrastructure. If 
one unit of civil casualties increase the vote share of secular parties decreases by one unit. The 
Models were estimated in a form, where i-province, t-year, ij= the change of voting behavior 
between and within the provinces:  
 
Graph  12 
 
                                                                                                                                       Figure 3: The relationship between 
violence and party choice. 
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Model 1:  
The Vote share of Secular parties = β10 + β11 x Terror Casualties it 
Model 2:  
 The Vote share of Secular parties = β20 + β21 x Terror Casualties it + β22 
state causalities it + β23 Sunni it + β24Kurd it + β25Mixed it + β26Education it + 
β27 Health it + β28Infrastructure it + β29 Housing it + β210 Household 
Economic Status it    
Model 3: 
The Vote share of Secular parties = β30 + β31 x Terror Casualties it + β32 state 
causalities it + + β33Education it + β34 Health it + β35 Infrastructure it + β36 
Housing it + β37 Household Economic Status it   + β38 ij Province Dummies it   
Model 4:  
The Vote share of Secular parties = β40 + β41 x Terror Casualties it + β42 state 
causalities it + β43 Education it + β 44Health+ β29Infrastructure+ β45 Housing 
+ β46 Household Economic Status it + β47 ij Province Dummies it + β48 ij Year 
Dummies  
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Table 3: Statistical Summary of the Data 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Year 72 2008.75 3.586948 2005 2014 
Population 72 1609244 1229660 514000 7255278 
No of seats/province 72 15.25 13.23434 5 70 
Registered voters 72 934781.5 816368.8 301970 4599000 
Tota lvotes 72 704514.9 986856.5 12989 7851093 
Turnout 72 .6620278 .159331 .02 .984 
Electoral divider  72 40114.59 11113.93 1443.222 62365 
Shiite parties votes 70 .4792459 .3557445 0 .9024582 
Sunni parties votes 72 .0939445 .1921317 0 .9169017 
Kurdish parties votes 72 .2153776 .3650053 0 .997 
Minority parties votes 71 .0070944 .0275501 0 .1754 
Secular parties votes 72 .1306277 .142479 0 .632 
 
Social groups 72 2.111111 1.250978 1 4 
Ethnicity 72 1.611111 .8316885 1 3 
Sect 72 1.722222 .8087936 1 3 
statenum 72 9.5 5.224536 1 18 
 
Terror casualties  72 547.1528 1237.082 0 8227 
Terror casualties/population 72 .0002336 .0003222 0 .0015543 
US/gov casualties  72 70.59722 228.8806 0 1800 
US/gov casualties 72 .000048 .0001773 0 .0014274 
Casualties of terror and US/gov 72 617.75 1300.078 0 8566 
Casualties of terror and 
US/gov/population 72 .0002816 .0003907 0 .0017201 
 
Deprivation of Education  72 35.46389 10.61214 15.1 55.9 
Deprivation of Health 72 26.675 9.264361 7.6 54.4 
Deprivation of Infrastructures 72 61.00833 19.19218 27 93.1 
Deprivation of Housing 72 28.02222 11.65879 3.9 50.3 
Deprivation of Household 
Economic status  72 47.27889 13.68972 17 80.4 
Source: IBC, UNDP, SCO Iraq and UNAMI  
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5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
5.1 Voting Behavior in Iraq  
Before starting implementing Panel Data Analysis, I will review the voting behavior in Iraq, 
using simple statistical analysis. The period between 2005 and 2014 there were four general 
elections that took place. 2005 is year in which Iraq had three elections. Within 11 months 
Iraqi people voted to elect a transitional parliament, then in a referendum for Iraq’s permanent 
constitution and finally for the first permanent parliament. The first ever democratic 
multiparty election was held on January 30
th
, 2005 to elect the Transitional National 
Assembly (TNA). Among other things, the main task for the transitional parliament was to 
draft a permanent constitution and prepare the country for a general election. The election 
boycotted by the vast majority of Sunnis. The level of turnout in Sunni provinces was very 
low- Anbar 2,8%, Ninawa 17% and Salah Adin 29%. In contrary to that, the Kurds strongly 
participated, where the turnout of Kurdish provinces was the highest in the country (about 
90%). Likewise the Shiite turnout (67, 11) was above the national average (about 59, 11%). 
The 275 seats of the new parliament dominated by a Shiite coalition, Iraqi National Alliance 
INA (140 seats) and Kurdistan Alliance (75 seats). While the secular Iraqi list and other 
nationalist parties received (43 seats); the remaining seats went to other small ethno-sectarian 
parties. Sunni’s political parties received 6 seats only. The total number of Sunnis in the 
parliament was 17 out of 275 members (about 6%) most of them belonging secular political 
parties. The estimates refers that about 75 percent of Sunni opted to boycott the election.  
However, the committee of the constitution invited several non-elected Sunni leaders to 
participate in drafting the constitution (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006).  . In the end the TNA 
managed to draft the constitution and On October 15
th
, 2005 about 78% of Iraqis approved the 
draft document with a turnout of 63% in a referendum. Both Shiite and Kurd overwhelmingly 
voted for the constitution while the majority of Sunni voted against it. The voting on 
constitution showed that people voted for or against based on ethno-sectarian grounds (see 
appendix 11).  
As in the first election, Sunni boycotted the election and then became the biggest loser and 
underrepresented. In second election of December 15
th
, 2005 of the four-year Council of 
Representatives CoR it Sunni show strong willingness to participate.  Despite the deteriorated 
security situation, the national turnout increased from (59,11) to (77%) due to the massive 
Sunni participation. The average Sunni and Kurd regions turnout was over above 85%, while 
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the Shiite and mixed regions and Baghdad was (71%) which is below the national average 
(71%). The total Sunni members in the parliament have increased from only 17 to about 60. 
Both of the two 2005 elections are characterized by voting that based on ethno-sectarian 
loyalties.  
The 2010 election was a benchmark for the students of the elections in Iraq. It was the only 
one among the four elections so far that witnessed a victory of the secular-national political 
forces. The Iraqi National List (secular) received about 25% of the total votes in all over Iraq, 
followed by the two major Shiite coalitions; the State of Law (24%) headed by the former 
prime minister Nori Al-Maliki and the Iraqi National Alliance (18%) and the Kurdistan 
Alliance (15%). However, the Iraqi National List failed to gather the required majority to 
form the government.  The two major Shiite coalitions and Kurds succeeded to form the 
majority and give the Iraqi List very small room for maneuvering. Nori Al-Maliki kept his 
position as a prime minister. A year after the elections the Americans and Iraqi government 
signed an agreement (The Strategic Frame Agreement) which stipulated the withdrawal of 
Americans troops, and the U.S. commitment to support Iraq on the issues of security and 
economy.  
The Sunnis who enormously voted for the Secular Iraqi National List felt that they had been 
cheated. The security situation declined, followed by massive Sunni protests against the Prime 
Minister Nori Al-Maliki. The U.S. left Iraq with inefficient Iraqi forces that are ill armed and 
incapable to contain the reemerging Sunni insurgency and Shiite militias influences on 
domestic politics (Cordesman and Burke 2010, Cordesman, and Kahzia 2014). In this 
atmosphere of the communal tension, the 2014 election witnessed a decline in the share of 
secular parties of votes, while the ethno-sectarian parties restored their share of votes that they 
received in the first two elections. Therefore, I argue that there is a very strong correlation 
between security situation, the sectarian conflict and voting behavior in Iraq (See Figure 3). 
There is a positive relationship between the scale of violence and ethno-sectarian voting. As 
was discussed in the theoretical approach (chapter 3), pervasive violence in heterogeneous 
societies intensifies ethno-sectarian voting behavior. The theory complies perfectly to explain 
voting behavior in Iraq. With the prevailing violence, the series of the elections resulted in 
deeply divided parliament along ethnic and sectarian lines. The exception was the 2010 
election due to the improvement of security situation and the decrease of sectarian incidents, 
which support the theoretical assumptions of this study that claim that violence and ethnic 
37 
 
voting behavior goes together hand to hand. (See Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 3 and 4 and 
Appendix 12). 
Table 4: Distribution of Iraqi parliamentary seats according to party ethno-sectarian affiliation 
 
Party  Aflifiation 
Jan. 2005 
seats 
Dec 2005 
seats 
2010 
seats 
2014 
Seats 
 
Shiite 
145 130 159 172 
Sunni 
 
6 58 6 47 
Kurd 
 
77 58 57 62 
Secular 
 
43 26 95* 39 
Other 
 
4 3 8 8 
Total 
 
275 275 325 328 
Turnout 59,11% 77% 62,3% 64,86% 
Source: High Independent Electoral Commission in Iraq and United Nation Mission Assistant to Iraq UNAMI 
Figure 3: Violence and secular voting in Iraq  
 
 
Source: HIEC, United Nation Mission Assistant to Iraq UNAMI and Iraq Body Count IBC.  
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5.2 Regression Analysis  
From the bivariate scatter I find strong indications for the presence of heteroscedasticity in 
general and a couple of influential cases in particular (See figure 4). For this reason, I start out 
with conducting a plain OLS regression followed by a post-estimation of influential cases, 
here measured by Cook’s D, Qadissiya 2014 (D=9.63) and Anbar 2005 (D=8.87) stands out 
and have distance values way above the usual cut-point of 1.  
Figure 4: Regression analysis, terror casualties and secular voting  
 
The Cook’s D is the combination of distance and deviation in relation to other observations 
and the distance measure tells us how much influence a specific observation has on the overall 
regression slope. In a bivariate regression, a majority of the cases have a Cook's D value 
between 0 and 1. Cases that deviates from the overall pattern usually have a D-value above 1, 
which means that the specific case is affecting the regression slope to an un-proportional high 
extent compared to the other observations and that the slope coefficient would change if the 
deviant case(s) is (are) removed. In this particular case Qadissiya and Anbar does, as mention, 
have a rather high Cook's D-value. However, the result remains roughly unchanged even 
though these two particular cases are being removed. In order to conduct a more formal test of 
the presence of heteroscedasticity, which is a violation of the OLS-assumptions, I performed a 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. In the test, the null hypothesis is based on the assumption 
that the regression disturbances are independent-normal with the variance (σ2). The test is 
statistically significant (chi2 = 26.17) and thus yields a more formal indication of that the 
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variance of the error-term is non-constant across observations. Basically, it tests to what 
extent is heteroscedasticity a significant problem, or rather present in the pattern of the data. If 
the test is significant, the solution is either to a) add more data or b) to conduct within- and 
between regression analyses. Due to the fact that it is difficult get more data on Iraq, and then 
I will go for b solution. 
The clustered structure of the data implies that I need to correct for the between unit variation, 
and even better, to model both the between- and within unit effects simultaneously. For this 
purpose a random effect model, with random intercepts (and slopes) can be applied. However, 
the random effect model assumes that the unit’s error term is not correlated with the 
predictors, which allows for time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables 
(Clarke & Linzer 2014).  
One way to test whether this assumption holds is to estimate both a random- and a fixed effect 
model and then conduct a Hausman test. The Hausman test takes the squared difference of the 
estimated coefficients between the random and fixed effects models over the difference in the 
estimated variance for the coefficients. The test is based on a chi-square distribution where the 
null-hypothesis is that the random effects model is the correct model. A large difference 
between the coefficients from the two models then implies that the null hypothesis is rejected, 
while a small difference implies that the null-hypothesis is not rejected and hence that the 
random effects model is the most efficient. The results from the Hausman tests for the two 
models in this paper results in a rejection of the null-hypothesis in both cases and that fixed 
effects are preferable over random effects (Bartels 2009). In order to illustrate the clustered 
structure of the data and the within province correlations, I have plotted bivariate scatterplots 
from a random effect model in the figures below.  
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Figure 5: Bivariate scatterplots from a random effect model of violence and secular voting. 
An interesting finding, and also one of the schoolbook examples of when fixed or random 
effects models should be used, is here illustrated by the positive correlation between 
casualties and secular voting in the first bivariate OLS model. In the three following models 
where I control for either ethnoreligious groups or province dummies, the effect from the 
main independent variable is shifting direction and becomes strongly negative. Hence, the 
more casualties from terrorism the less do citizens vote for secular parties and this result holds 
under control for a row of potential rival explanations. The question of causality is, however, 
an intricate. Is it in provinces where voters already are very religious or where ethnoreligious 
identities already are strong that I find more terror or are the terror bombings actually causing 
the voting for non-secular parties? The solution to this problem is to include a one year lag in 
the independent variable. This approach does not entirely solve the issue of causality but at 
least it partly does so. By including the number of casualties from terrorism the year before 
the election I can at least be certain on that the order of the events is correct.   Also, the 
correlation between (civil casualties by terrorist) and (civil casualties by Americans and Iraqi 
forces) is (r=.15) is not much at all actually so killing sprees by the Americans doesn't seem to 
coincide with terror attacks (see table 5).  
In model 1- a plain OLS was conducted, where terror casualties is the independent variable 
and secular voting the dependent variable. In model 2, one more independent variable (civil 
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(Shiite, Sunni, Kurd and mixed) and socioeconomic indicators (education, health, 
infrastructure, housing and households economic) are added as control variables. In model 3 
the two independent variables are left from Model 2 and the socioeconomic indicators and 
province dummies variables are used as control variables. Province dummies are used to 
control for the change in secular voting within the provinces. In model 4, the same variables 
as in model 3 are used and year dummies are included in order to control for the change of 
secular voting between the provinces.  The following part is the discussion of the results of 
the four models. Also, check for error term and multicollinearity was conducted (see Table 5).   
Table 5: Multiple Regression Models on Secular Voting in Iraq (OLS with fixed effects) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Sec.Gov. Sec.Gov. Sec.Gov. Sec.Gov. 
Terror Casualties  131.537** -147.951* -264.649** -191.610** 
 
(50.460) (59.244) (74.127) (56.320) 
Gove Casualties 
 
78.587 111.318* 86.121* 
  
(89.169) (38.653) (33.284) 
  
 
  
  
 
  Sunni (Ref. Shiite) 
 
0.257*** 
  
  
(0.074) 
  Kurd (Ref. Shiite) 
 
-0.034 
  
  
(0.062) 
  Mixed (Ref. Shiite) 
 
0.196*** 
  
  
(0.056) 
  Education 
 
-0.003 -0.008* -0.005 
  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Health 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Infrastructure 
 
0.002 0.004 0.004* 
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Housing 
 
0.001 0.001 -0.000 
  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Households Economic  
 
0.001 0.002 0.004 
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Provins-dummies no no yes yes 
Year-dummies no no no yes 
Constant 0.100*** 0.093 0.178 -0.006 
  (0.020) (0.111) (0.137) (0.204) 
R2-within .12 .25 .30 .52 
R2-between .74 .86 .02 .00 
R2-overall .09 .50 .03 .13 
Rho 0 0 .60 .66 
No. Of obs. 72 72 72 72 
No. Of groups 18 18 18 18 
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However, the results of this analysis show that the voters in the Sunni and mixed regions are 
the most sensitive to violence, while other groups are also sensitive to a lesser degree. 
Although the factor of violence is of significant importance, other factors such as history and 
the degree of ethnoreligious identity also might explain the variation of sensitivity to violence 
among different ethno-religious groups.  
To interpret the outcome from this regression equation important to remember that the 
dependent variable measure the support for secular parties in percentages in Iraqi provinces 
over four elections, under control for a row of different background variables. The main 
independent variable is the number of casualties per thousand inhabitants measured one year 
before the elections in each province.  The mean value for secular voting is (.131) while the 
mean for casualties per thousand inhabitants is (.0002). Since the numbers are so small, the 
coefficients are difficult to interpret. Simply I find that the effect is very large but what does it 
mean in terms of change in percentages for secular voting? One way to interpret the effect or 
rather, to make the scale interpretable is to standardize. Hence, if the take the coefficient from 
the effect of casualties on secular voting in model four and multiply it according to the 
standard deviation in casualties per thousand inhabitants (-191.6097*0.0003222) we receive a 
value of (-.062) which simply means that if the number of casualties per thousand inhabitants 
is changing with one standard deviation, voting for secular parties is decreasing with about 6 
percentage points. The effect is thus quite small but statistically significant. At the same time, 
the Pearson’s r is .298 between the dependent and the independent variable so we know that 
they are intermediately related. Taken together, these results indicate a significant relationship 
between terror attacks and secular voting.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
Iraq has made great progress through the hard process of transforming from authoritarian to 
plural governing. Since January 30, 2005 Iraq has practiced many multiparty elections on 
local and national levels, which had the minimum requirements to have been considered as 
fair and just according to many international observers (Sir Harold Walker & Sir Terence 
Clark 2005). With the implementation of elections, both Iraqi people and international 
community hope that coups and revolutions would stop, which they eventually did so far. 
Elections have become the most important path of determining who occupies official 
positions in the legislative, executive and judicial powers to a certain extent. Moreover, Iraqi 
people show their strong believe in the democratic practice through their genuine willingness 
to participate in elections, where the average of turnout is above 60%. On the other hand, Iraq 
is one of the most unfortunate nations in the world, as it suffers from prevalence of sectarian 
violence and indiscriminate terrorism. I argue that violence is one of the main reasons behind 
the rise of ethnoreligious parties and the fading of secular parties. This hypothesis is based on 
the assumption, that identities are socially constructed. People have many identities; it could 
be national, ethnic, religious, tribal, lingual, etc. I argue that the communal violence leads to 
an increase of saliency of primordial identities. It increases inter-group solidarity and distrust 
towards people from other groups. Violence makes people vote for parties and candidates 
who comply with their ethnoreligious background.  
Using a unique dataset that includes the civilian victims of terror attacks one year before 
election and the results of the four general elections that took place in Iraq in January 2005, 
December 2005, March 2010 and April 2014, I measured the effect of terror casualties on the 
secular voting. The results show a strong negative correlation between the level of violence 
and the vote share of secular parties. Secular parties represent the left and ethnoreligious 
represent the conservative or right wing. It was interesting to see that including terror 
casualties and vote share of secular parties in a simple regression analysis produces a positive 
relationship between those two variables.  However, controlling for ethno-sectarian affiliation 
and socioeconomic indicators changes the direction of the relationship to strongly negative. 
This relation holds by adding different variables, there were different levels of sensitivity 
toward violence of different ethno-sectarian groups. The Sunni Arabs is the most group that 
changed its voting preference in response to the level of violence. As was discussed in the 
theory section, there are other potential factors that affect party choice of the various groups 
of the Iraqi people. It could be internal, historical, institutional, cultural and international 
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factors. For example, Kurds are a minority that suffered from assimilation policies in the 
whole Middle East region. Voting for Kurdish parties is one way to introduce significant 
achievements that improve the conditions of Kurdish people.  Likewise, despite that Shiite 
forms the majority of the population in Iraq they are a minority within Arab and Islamic 
realm. They have suffered from discrimination and have been neglected for many decades. 
Voting for Shiite parties might be the most proper way for them to avoid persecution. For the 
Sunni Arabs who have been the ruler elites of Iraq since the establishment in 1920, and since 
they are a minority, voting for secular parties is the most appropriate formal channel to avoid 
Shiite hegemony. Because voting on ethno-sectarian biases would always result in Shiite 
majority in parliament. For the Kurds it does not matter a lot when comparing with Sunni 
Arabs, because they have their own autonomous administrative region in the far north of the 
country and are semi-independent in issues of security and finance. Furthermore, it might 
require much more time for Kurds and Shiite to get rid of the negative externalities of the 
tyranny of the previous regimes of Iraq. However, this thesis proved that the more civil 
casualties caused by -terrorism/communal violence, the less people vote for secular parties.  
However, the findings show that the Iraqi voter follow his/her ethno-sectarian group voting 
preferences. It is clear that voting primarily serves the interest of the group.  
The results of this study are coinciding with the results of similar studies that were conducted 
in the well-established democracies Berrebi and Klor (2006 and 2008), Kibris (2010). People 
are sensitive to terrorism. Violence mobilizes people and affects their political choices. Iraqi 
people are just like other people in different parts of the world- they show high sensitivity 
toward terrorism.  
Unfortunately, it is quite hard to examine whether terrorism makes Iraqi people punish the 
government or not, because all the parties in parliament are represented in the government. In 
the discourse of the political parties, all parties blame each other for the failure in delivering 
sufficient public service and security. However, according to practice, the Prime Minister’s 
(always Shiite) party is considered to be the government, Sunni are the opposition and the 
Kurds are something in between.  
This thesis attempts to contribute to the few existing literature on violence and election in Iraq 
and to expand our knowledge about this phenomenon in the countries that have a similar 
social and political context. However, there is much room left for future researches. This area 
of research has a lot of potential and is very promising. By investing more in empirical data 
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i.e. providing much more disaggregated data on elections and other potentially correlated 
variables, we can obtain more concrete results that can develop our understanding about 
ethnicities, religions, violence and politics. -An important issue to highlight is that this 
research makes the myth of the election being the reason of a country’s disintegration invalid. 
Some scholars argue that Iraq’s sandy soil is not fertile enough for democracy due to the 
country’s geopolitical and ethnoreligious predispositions (Wimmer, 2007, Byman and 
Pollack, 2003). But, in this paper I proved that violence is responsible for ethnic politics in 
Iraq. Controlling for violence makes people focus more on issues like employment, public 
service and economic growth instead of ethnoreligious politics. Enhancing the security 
situation and enforcing the principle of the rule of law will give the chance to the citizens to 
think twice when they cast their votes. Hence, it means to have a consistent government, that 
can guarantee the integrity and the prosperity of the country and to have an active opposition 
that monitors the performance of the government.   
Since the results of this analysis show that Sunni Arabs are the most sensitive to violence, 
increasing security measurement in their regions and focusing on using efficient procedure 
that minimize the casualties among civilians would result in less ethno-sectarian politics in 
Iraq.  Finally, the results show that it is not in the interests of ethnic and sectarian parties to 
eliminate the violence totally in Iraq, because it means the loss of many of their electoral 
gains that they have made under the circumstances of sectarian unrest. A degree of communal 
skirmishes that don’t leads to regime collapse is in favor of those parties.  
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8.APPENDICES  
Appendix 1. Ethnoreligious Groups Distribution     
Province  Population 2014 Ethnoreligious Composition 
Anbar 1,720000 Absolut Sunni/Arab majority 
Babylon 1,800000 Shiite/Arab with Sunni minority  
Baghdad 
7,255278 
Overwhelming Arab Majority /Mixed  
Shiite/Sunni/Christian  
Basra  
2,601790 
Shiite/Arab and Sunni and Christians 
Minorities 
Diyala 1,480000 Mixed Arab/Kurd/Sunni/Shiite  
Dahuk 1,300000 Kurd mainly Sunni 
Erbil 
1,800000 
Kurd mainly Sunni and other small 
minorities 
Karbala  1,094000 Absolut Shiite/Arab 
Missan  1000000 Absolut Shiite/Arab 
Muthanna  735905 Absolut Shiite/Arab 
Najaf  1,300019 Absolut Shiite/Arab 
Ninawa  
3,675000 
Mixed Arab/Kurd/Sunni/Shiite/Christians 
and other small minorities (majority Sunni 
Arab) 
Qadisiya  1,162000 Mainly Shiite/Arab  
Salah El Din  1,473000 Sunni/Arab majority with Shiite and Kurd  
Sulyamaniya  1,931561 Kurd mainly Sunni 
Tamim/Kirku 
1,169171 
Mixed Kurd/Arab/Turkmen/Sunni/Shiite and 
Christian  
Thi-Qar 2,021474 Shiite/Arab and Sunni Minority  
Wasit  1,275000 Shiite/Arab 
 
  
Appendix 2. level of turnout according to ethnoreligious affiliation.   
Year Shiite Regions Sunni Regions Kurd Regions Mixed National 
Jan 2005 67,11 15,5 87 42 59,11 
Dec 2005 71,2 77 90,5 75,32 77 
2010 57,78 63,85 74,63 62,5 62,3 
2014 68,31 49,45 75,46 62,52 66,12 
Average 66,1 51,45 81,89 60,58 64,68 
-Turnout (%) of the parliamentary elections according to ethno-religious affiliation.  
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Appendix 3. Administrative map of Iraq  
 
Appendix 4. Ethnoreligious composition of Iraq  
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Appendix 5. Ethnoreligious affiliation of the Iraqi provinces 
 
Ethnoreligious  
Shiite Babylon, Basrah, Karbla, Missan  
Muthanna, Qadisiya, Najaf, Thi 
Qar, Wasit 
Sunni Anbar, Salah Eldin 
Kurd Dahuk, Erbil, Suliamaniya  
Mixed Baghdad1, Diyala2, Kirkuk3 
 
Ethnicities 
Arab Anbar, Babylon, Basrah, Karbla, 
Missan, Muthanna, Qadisiya, 
Najaf, Ninawa, Thi Qar, Wasit 
Kurd Dahuk, Erbil, Suliamaniya 
Mixed Diyala, Kirkuk3, Ninawa2 
 
 
Religions  
Shiite Babylon, Basrah, Karbla, Missan  
Muthanna, Qadisiya, Najaf, Thi 
Qar, Wasit 
Sunni Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaimaniya, 
Anabar, SalahEdin, Kirkuk,  
Ninawa 
Mixed Baghdad1, Diyala2 
 Note: M1= Shiite Majority, M2=Sunni Majority, M3= Kurd Majority  
 
Appendix 6. Political parties in Iraq 
Ethno-religious Party 
affiliation 
Political Party 
 
 
Shiite 
 
 
 
Islamist 
 
-Islamic Dawa party 
- Sadrist Movement 
-Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq ISCI (previously Supreme 
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) 
-Virtue Party Fadeela 
-National Reform Trend 
Nationalist 
 
-Iraqi National Congers 
 
 
Sunni 
 
Islamist 
 
Islamic Party 
 
Pan-Arabism-
nationalist 
 
-Iraqi National Dialogue Front Al-Hiwar 
-Muttahidoon 
- Renewal List 
-The Iraqis 
-Al-Hadba 
-Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc 
 
 
 
Kurd 
 
Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PUK 
Movement for Change  Gorran 
Kurdistan Islamic Union KIU 
Kurdistan Islamic Union 
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Secular 
 
-Iraqi National Accord 
-Civil Democratic Alliance 
-Iraqi Communist Party 
-National Democratic Party 
-Constitutional Monarchy Movement 
-Assembly of Independent Democrats 
 
 
Other 
 
Iraqi Turkmen Front 
Turkmen People's Party 
 
 
Appendix 7. Election results January 30, 2005 
Party or Alliance Affiliation  Total National 
Votes 
Percent of 
national Vote 
national Seats 
Iraqi National Alliance  Shiite 4,075,292 50,07 140 
Kurdistan Alliance  Kurd 2,175,551 26,73 75 
The Iraqi List Secular 1,168,943 14,3628 40 
Iraqis  Sunni 150,680 1,8514 5 
Turkmen Iraq Front  Minority 93,480 1,1486 3 
National Independent 
Cadres Elites  
Shiite 69,938 
0,085 
3 
Nation Union  Secular 69,920 0,085 2 
Islamic Group of 
Kurdistan  
Kurd 60,592 
0,0,0744 
2 
Islamic Action 
Organization  
Shiite 43,205 
0,0,053 
2 
National Democratic 
Alliance  
Secular  36,795 
0,0,045 
1 
Al-rafideen National List  Minority/
Christian 
36,255 
0,0,044 
1 
Liberation and 
Reconciliation Gathering  
Sunni 30,796 
0,037 
1 
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Appendix 8. Election results December 15, 2005 
Party or Alliance Affiliation  Total National 
Votes 
Percent of 
national Vote % 
national Seats 
United Iraqi Alliance Shiite 4691945 43,78 128 
Kurdistan Alliance  Kurd 1786775 16,67 53 
Iraqi Accord front Sunni 1484181 13,84 44 
Iraqi national List Secular 829985 7,74 25 
Iraqi National Dialogue 
Front  
Sunni 405077 3,77 11 
Al-Risaliyun Shiite 128868 1,20 5 
Kurdistan Islamic Union  Kurd 119245 1,11 2 
Reconciliation and 
Liberation Bloc 
Sunni 97575 0,91 3 
Turkmen Front Minority 71294 0,66 1 
Rafidain List Minority/
Christian  
33948 0,4 1 
Iraq Nation Party/Mithal 
Al Alusi 
Secular 32,245 0.3 1 
Yazidi Movement for 
Reform and Progress 
Minority  21,908 0,2 1 
 
 
 
Appendix 9. Election results March 7, 2010 
 
Party or Alliance Affiliation  Total National 
Votes 
Percent of 
national Vote 
national Seats 
Iraqi National Movement (al-
Iraqiya) 
Secular 
2779805 
24,3 
91 
State of Law Coalition Shiite 2723698 23,81 89 
National Iraqi Alliance Shiite 2047972 17,9 70 
Kurdistan Alliance Kurd 1635037 14,29 43 
Movement for Change 
(Gorran) 
Kurd 
402018 
3,51 
8 
Unity Alliance of Iraq Secular 148692 1,3 4 
Iraqi Accord Front (Twafik) Sunni 233609 2,04 6 
Kurdistan Islamic Union KIU Kurd 214222 1,87 4 
Islamic Group of Kurdistan 
IGK 
 
141855 
1,24 
2 
Minorities  61,153 457481 8 
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Appendix 10. Election results April 30, 2014 
Party or Alliance Affiliation  Total National 
Votes 
Percent of 
national Vote 
national Seats 
State of Law Shiite 3141835 27,04 92 
Saddrist movement Shiite 953615 8,20 34 
AlMuwatin coalition Shiite 951214 9,07 29 
Kurdistan Democratic Party 
KDP 
Kurd 1038002 
7,33 25 
Muttahidoon Sunni 680690 5,85 23 
Al-Iraqiyaa Secular 569651 5,90 21 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
PUK  
Kurd 324858 
6,71 21 
Al-Arabiya Coalition  Sunni 324858 2,7 10 
Gorran  Kurd 451858 3,88 9 
Iraq Alliance Secular 153672 1,32 8 
Islamic Virtue Party Shiite 211257 1,81 6 
National Reform Trend  Shiite 192763 1,65 6 
Diyala Identity Sunni 159605 1,37 5 
Kurdistan Islamic Union KIU Kurd 165856 1,42 4 
Kurdistan Islamic group KIG Kurd 137594 1,18 3 
Nieneva national Alliance Shiite 112563 0,68 3 
Civil Democratic Alliance Secular 112563 0,96 3 
Loyalty to Al-Anbar Sunni  0,50 3 
Iraqi Turkmen Front Minority 71492 0,61 2 
Iraq Loyalty Alliance Secular 67796 0,86 2 
Competence and People 
Gathering 
Secular  
0,57 2 
Unity of Iraqi (Wehdet Abnaa 
Al-Iraq 
Secular  
0,40 2 
Others      
 
 Appendix 11. Iraq’s constitutional referendum, October 2005 
Province  Votes For % Against % Ethno-religious Affiliation  
Anbar 259919 3,04 96,9 Sunni Arab 
Babylon 543779 94,56 5,44 Shiite Arab 
Baghdad 2,120615 77,7 22,3 Mixed 
Basra  691024 96.2 3.98 Shiite Arab 
Diyala 476980 51,27 48,73 Mixed, Arab/Sunni/Shiite/kurd 
Dahuk 389198 99,13 0,87 Kurd 
Erbil 830570 99,36 0,64 Kurd 
Karbala  264674 96,58 3,42 Shiite Arab 
Missan  254067 97,79 2.21 Shiite Arab 
Muthanna  185710 98,65 1,35 Shiite Arab 
Najaf  299420 95,82 4,18 Shiite Arab 
Ninawa  718758 44,92 55,08 Mixed/Sunni Arab majority  
Qadisiya  297176 96,74 3,32 Shiite Arab 
Salah El Din  510152 18,25 81,75 Sunni Arab  
Sulyamaniya  723,723 98,96 1,04 Kurd 
Tamim/Kirku 542,688 62,91 37,09 Mixed Kurd/Arab/Turkmen/Sunni/Shiite 
Thi-Qar 462710 97,15 2,85 Shiite Arab 
Wasit  280128 95,7 4,3 Shiite Arab 
Total  9,852291 78,59 21,41 
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Appendix 12. Ethno-religious affiliation and turnout (%) of the parliamentary 
elections  
Year Shiite 
Regions 
Sunni 
Regions 
Kurd Regions Mixed National 
Jan 2005 67,11 15,5 87 42 59,11 
Dec 2005 71,2 92 90,5 75,32 77 
2010 57,78 63,85 74,63 62,5 62,3 
2014 68,31 49,45 75,46 62,52 66,12 
Average 66,1 51,45 81,89 60,58 64,68 
Source: HIEC and United Nation Mission Assistant to Iraq UNAMI 
 
Appendix 13. “Stata” Do-File   
clear all 
import excel using "C:\Users\gusnajiam\Desktop\Stata anlysis\Plimenary test data.xlsx", clear firstrow 
destring turnout, replace 
destring D_*, replace  
drop Y D_houc 
drop if governorate =="" 
label define ethgr 1 "Shiite" 2 "Sunni" 3 "Kurd" 4 "Mixed"  
label value Ethnic_co ethgr 
ren Ethnic_co Soc_group   
gen Ethnicity = .  
replace Ethnicity = 1 if Soc_group == 1  
replace Ethnicity = 1 if Soc_group == 2 
replace Ethnicity = 2 if Soc_group == 3 
replace Ethnicity = 3 if Soc_group == 4 
label define ethnic 1 "Arab" 2 "Kurd" 3 "Mixed"  
label value Ethnicity ethnic 
gen Sect = .  
replace Sect = 1 if Soc_group == 1 
replace Sect = 2 if Soc_group == 2 
replace Sect = 2 if Soc_group == 3 
replace Sect = 3 if Soc_group == 4 
label define sect 1 "Shiite" 2 "Sunni" 3 "Mixed"  
label value Sect sect 
tab Sect  
reg  SE_v V1 Year  
gen V1_pop = V1/Population  
scatter turnout V1_pop if Year == 2014 
reg  SE_v V1_pop i.Year  
gen V2_pop = V2/Population  
gen V_Tpop = V_Tot/Population  
order governorate Year Population N_seats Reg_voters totalvotes turnout El_div SH_v SU_v Kurd_v M_v SE_v 
Soc_group V1 V1_pop V2 V2_pop V_Tot V_Tpop  
egen statenum = group(governorate) 
xtset statenum Year 
xtline SE_v, overlay 
twoway /// 
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 (scatter SE_v V1_pop if Ethn == 1) /// 
 (scatter SE_v V1_pop if Ethn == 2) /// 
 (lfit SE_v V1_pop if Ethn == 1) /// 
 (lfit SE_v V1_pop if Ethn == 2)  
 
use "C:\Users\gusnajiam\Desktop\Stata anlysis\dataset_sd.dta", clear 
xtset statenum Year    
esttab m1 m2 m3 m4, cells(b(star fmt(%9.3f)) se(par)) stats(r2_a N, fmt(%9.3f %9.0g) labels(R-squared))      /// 
legend label collabels(none) varlabels(_cons Constant) 
sysuse auto 
eststo clear 
eststo: xtreg weight length turn , fe i(rep78) 
estadd local fixed "yes" , replace 
eststo: xtreg weight length turn , re i(rep78) 
estadd local fixed "no" , replace 
esttab , cells(b) indicate(turn) s(fixed N, label("fixed effects")) 
 
**hausman test** 
use "C:\Users\gusnajiam\Desktop\Stata anlysis\dataset_sd.dta", clear 
xtreg SE_v V1_pop, fe 
estimate store fe 
xtreg SE_v V1_pop, re 
estimate store re 
hausman fe re 
*** 
hist SE_v, norm 
hist V1_pop, norm 
 
* Bivariate Secular voting - Violence 
*xtreg y x, fe 
* Multivariate Secular voting - Violence + 
xtreg SE_v V1_pop i.Soc_group 
reg SE_v V1_po 
twoway (scatter SE_v V1_pop, mlabel(governorate) ytitle(Support for secular parties (mean)) xtitle(No of terror 
related causalties/cap. (mean)) caption("b=131.537" "R2=.09" "N: 72")) (lfit  SE_v V1_pop) , scheme(s1mono) 
 
* Multivariate Secular voting  - Violence +++ 
 
*i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco D_lsi 
sum SE_v V1_pop 
xtreg SE_v V1_pop 
estimates store m1, title(Model 1) 
xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco  
estimates store m2, title(Model 2) 
xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco, fe cluster(statenum) 
estimates store m3, title(Model 3) 
xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco i.Year, fe cluster(statenum) 
estimates store m4, title(Model 4) 
 
*produces table in paper 
esttab m1 m2 m3 m4, cells(b(star fmt(%9.3f)) se(par)) stats(r2_a N, fmt(%9.3f %9.0g) labels(R-squared))      /// 
legend label collabels(none) varlabels(_cons Constant) 
 
**standardized interpretation of coeficcient from model 4. 
sum SE_v V1_pop 
60 
 
display -191.6097*0.0003222 
 
**beta 
sum SE_v V1_pop 
xtreg SE_v V1_pop, fe 
display -189.5716*0.0003222 
display 0.06107997/0.142479 
xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco Year, re 
xtmixed  SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco Year || statenum: V1_pop, mle 
covariance(unstructured)  
predict prmodel, fitted 
sort statenum prmodel 
twoway (scatter prmodel V1_pop ) (lfit prmodel V1_pop ), by(statenum)  scheme(s1mono) 
 
*sysuse auto 
eststo clear 
eststo: xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco , fe i(statenum) 
estadd local fixed "yes" , replace 
eststo: xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco , re i(statenum) 
estadd local fixed "no" , replace 
esttab , cells(b) indicate(V2_pop) s(fixed N, label("fixed effects")) 
 
**checking for outliers. 
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco Year 
predict D, cooksd 
tab D 
gen influ=0 
recode influ (0=1) if D>1 
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco influ 
 
***NORMALITY DISTRIBUTION OF ERROR TERMS 
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco 
predict estu if e(sample), rstudent 
hist estu, normal 
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco 
predict x2, xb 
predict esta, rstandard  
scatter esta x2 
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco 
hettest 
estat imtest, white 
 
*Multicoelineraity 
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco i.Soc_group 
estat vif 
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco  
estat vif 
reg SE_v V1_pop if Ethnicity == 1 
reg SH_v V1_pop if Ethnicity == 1 
reg SU_v V1_pop if Ethnicity == 1 
reg SE_v V1_pop if Ethnicity == 2 
reg SE_v V1_pop if Ethnicity == 1    
  
 
 
 
